We extend the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya anonymous credential system such that selective disclosure of attributes becomes highly efficient. The resulting system significantly improves upon existing approaches, which suffer from a linear number of modular exponentiations in the total number of attributes. This limitation makes them unfit for many practical applications, such as electronic identity cards. Our novel approach can incorporate a large number of binary and finite-set attributes without significant performance impact. It compresses all such attributes into a single attribute base and, thus, boosts the efficiency of all proofs of possession. The core idea is to encode discrete binary and finite-set values as prime numbers. We then use the divisibility property for efficient proofs of their presence or absence. In addition, we contribute efficient methods for conjunctions and disjunctions. The system builds on the strong RSA assumption. We demonstrate the aptness of our method in realistic application scenarios, notably electronic identity cards, and show its advantages for small devices, such as smartcards and cell phones.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of user-centric identity management amplifies the need for a combination of strong security and privacy protection. Anonymous credential systems are one of the most promising answers to this need. They allow users to selectively prove statements about their identity attributes.
Industry aims to employ anonymous credential systems on PCs and small devices with very limited computational power, such as cell phones and corporate or government-issued electronic identity cards. Previously proposed anonymous credential systems are not practical for such restricted devices because the complexity of proving possession of an attribute is linear in the total number of attributes in the credential.
European electronic identity cards, for instance, often contain several attributes that are either binary or discrete values from predefined finite sets. In fact, these cumulated bit length of prime products as a possible limiting factor. Section 7 governs possible application scenarios, such as electronic identity cards and role-based access control. We conclude the paper in Section 8. We provide a formal protocol specification for setup and issuing in Appendix A. Appendix B considers professional taxonomies as additional application example.
RELATED WORK
Chaum pioneered privacy-enhancing cryptographic protocols that minimize the amount of personal data disclosed. His work put forth the principles of anonymous credentials [Chaum 1981 [Chaum , 1985 Chaum and Evertse 1987] , group signatures [Chaum and van Heyst 1991] , and electronic cash [Chaum 1983 ]. These concepts have in common that some party issues a signature in which the message signed includes information about the user (i.e., attributes). Subsequently, more efficient implementations of these concepts were proposed, and a number of related concepts were introduced, including group signatures [Ateniese et al. 2000; Boneh et al. 2004 ; Kiayias and Yung 2006] , e-cash [Brands 1993; Camenisch et al. 2005; Frankel et al. 1998 ], anonymous credentials [Brands 1995a [Brands , 1995b 1999; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001, 2004] , traceable signatures [Kiayias et al. 2004] , anonymous auctions [Naor et al. 1999] , and electronic voting based on blind signatures [Fujioka et al. 1992] . Many of these schemes use signed attributes and protocols that selectively reveal these attributes or prove properties about them as building blocks. The implementations in question typically encode attributes as a discrete logarithm or, more generally, as an element (exponent) of a representation of a group element, resulting in protocols in which the number of group elements transmitted and the computations performed are linear in the number of encoded attributes.
There is also some work in which zero-knowledge proof techniques are proposed for proving AND, OR, and NOT statements about attributes encoded as discrete logarithms, for example, "a user has attribute a OR b," basically showing that some committed value equals a given value OR some other given value [Boudot 2000; Brands 1997; Camenisch and Michels 1999; Cramer et al. 1994; Fujisaki and Okamoto 1997] .
We significantly improve on the existing work. Our proof protocols are far more efficient than known ones for showing that some given attribute value is encoded in a credential, as well as for proving AND, OR, and NOT statements.
PRELIMINARIES

Assumptions
Special RSA Modulus. We call a modulus n a special RSA modulus if it has the form pq, where p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 and are safe primes. We call this setup a special RSA (SRSA) setting.
Hardness of Factoring. We make the assumption that factoring integers n, as just specified is hard.
Strong RSA Assumption [Fujisaki and Okamoto 1997; Barić and Pfitzmann 1997] . Given a special RSA modulus just as specified and a random element g ∈ Z * n , it is hard to compute h ∈ Z * n and e > 1, such that h e ≡ g mod n. The strong RSA assumption applies that factoring is hard.
Discrete Logarithm Assumption. Let G be a finite cyclic group and g ∈ G be a generator of G. The discrete logarithm of some element a ∈ G, denoted log g a, is the unique integer x, 0 ≤ x < |G|, such that a = g x . We assume that the discrete logarithm problem is hard; that is, given this setup, it is hard to find the integer x, 0 <= x < |G|, such that a = g x holds. Other primitives, such as the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to generate signatures from zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, may require additional assumptions. This is orthogonal to the credential system itself.
Integer Commitments
In the commitment scheme [Pedersen 1992 . Damgård and Fujisaki 2001 show that if group G is an RSA group and the committer is not privy to the factorization of the modulus, then the Pedersen commitment scheme can indeed be used to commit to integers of arbitrary size.
Known Discrete-Logarithm-Based, Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In the common parameters model, we use several previously known results for proving statements about discrete logarithms, such as
(1) Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo a prime [Schnorr 1991 ] or a composite [Damgård and Fujisaki 2001; Fujisaki and Okamoto 1997] . (2) Proof of knowledge of equality of representation modulo two (possibly different) prime [Chaum and Pedersen 1993] or composite [Camenisch and Michels 1999] moduli. (3) Proof that a commitment opens to the product of two other committed values [Brands 1997; Camenisch 1998; Camenisch and Michels 1999] . (4) Proof that a committed value lies in a given integer interval [Boudot 2000; Camenisch and Michels 1999; Chan et al. 1998 ]. (5) Proof of the disjunction or conjunction of any two of the previous proofs [Cramer et al. 1994 ].
These protocols modulo a composite are secure under the strong RSA assumption and modulo a prime, under the discrete logarithm assumption. When referring to the preceding proofs, we will follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [1997] for various proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and proofs of the validity of statements about discrete logarithms. For instance,
denotes a "zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of integers α, β, and δ, such that y = g α h β andỹ =g αhδ holds, where u ≤ α ≤ v," where y, g, h,ỹ,g, andh are elements of some groups G = g = h andG = g = h . The convention is that Greek letters denote quantities of knowledge being proved, whereas all other values are known to the verifier. We apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [Fiat and Shamir 1987 ] to turn such proofs of knowledge into signatures on some message m; this is denoted as, for example, SPK{(α) : y = g α }(m). Given a protocol in this notation, it is straightforward to derive an actual protocol implementing the proof. Indeed, the computational complexities of the proof protocol can be derived easily from this notation: basically for each term y = g α h β , the prover and the verifier have to perform an equivalent computation and transmit one group element and one response value for each exponent. With a statement such as (u ≤ α ≤ v), we denote interval checks which are basically free [Camenisch and Michels 1999; Chan et al. 1998 ] but are not tight (however, good enough if the non-tightness can be accounted, for as in our application). 1 We note that this excludes interval proof protocols, such as those of Boudot [2000] , that are tight but computationally costly, that is, they require the prover to provide a number of integer commitments and prove relations among them.
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
Let us recall Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures 2003. (We present a straightforward variant that allows messages to be negative integers, as well). Let m , e , n , r , and L be system parameters. r is a security parameter. The meanings of the others will be defined later.
Throughout the article, we denote the set of integers {−(2
m . Elements of this set can thus be encoded as binary strings of length m plus an additional bit carrying the sign, that is, m + 1 bits in total.
Key Generation. On input n , choose an n -bit RSA modulus n, such that n = pq, p = 2p + 1, and q = 2q + 1, where p, q, p , and q are primes. Choose, uniformly at random, R 0 , . . . , R L−1 , S, Z ∈ QR n . Output the public key (n, R 0 , . . . , R L−1 , S, Z ) and the secret key p.
Message space. This is the set
Signing Algorithm. On input m 0 , . . . , m L−1 , choose a random prime number e of length e > m + 2 and a random number v of length v = n + m + r . Compute
The signature consists of (e, A , v).
Verification Algorithm. To verify that the tuple (e, A , v) is a signature on message (m 0 , . . . , m L−1 ), check that the following statements hold. [Goldwasser et al. 1988] under the strong RSA assumption.
1 A verifier of a -proof achieves a non-tight interval check by verifying the bit length of the -proof 's response values and approximating the bit length of the secret factor included. The approximation is based on the knowledge of the bit length of challenge and commitment randomness. "Not tight" means that the verifier can only verify the approximate bit length of the secret, but not whether it is within an exact interval.
Proving Knowledge of a Signature. Let us further recall how a prover can prove that she possesses a CL signature, without revealing any other information about the signature.
Of course we want to use the protocols described in Section 3.3. If A were a public value, we could do so by proving knowledge representation of Z with respect to R 0 , . . . , R L−1 , S, and A. Obviously, making A public would destroy privacy, as that would make all transactions linkable. Luckily, one can randomize A. Given a signature (A , e, v) , the tuple (A := A S −r mod n, e, v := v + er) is also valid signature. Provided that A ∈ S and that r is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} n + ∅ , the value A is distributed statistically close-to-uniform over Z * n . Thus, the user could compute a fresh A each time, reveal it, and then run the following protocol with the verifier.
There is a technical consequence of this proof protocol regarding the statements
. Although these can be implemented virtually for free, they require that the secret actually lies in a smaller interval; that is, the signer needs to choose e from [2 e −1 −2 e +1, 2 e −1 +2 e −1] with e < e − ∅ − H −3, where ∅ and H are security parameters (the first controlling statistical zero-knowledge and the second being the size of the challenge message in the PK protocol). Similarly, we require that the size of messages input into the signature scheme is limited:
(see [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2003] ). As the proofs can only guarantee that the absolute value of the messages are smaller than 2 m , we also include negative messages in the message space, for consistency. Finally, we note that in Z ≡ ±R
, there appears a "±". This is a technicality in the proofs of knowledge in RSA groups. Because of the group structure of Z * n and its subgroup QR n over a special RSA modulus n, there exist small-order subgroups which may allow a prover to include a multiple of small known order, as well as to prove a statement for the negation with probability 1/2.
2 This is not a problem for the application at hand, however, because e-being an odd prime by definition-maintains the negation and allows a reduction to the strong RSA assumption, in this case. We refer to Damgård and Fujisaki [2001] for further details.
Traditional Encoding of Attributes and Proofs about Them
We now discuss how attributes are typically encoded in privacy-enhancing primitives found in the literature. We focus on the CL credential system, but the principles are the same in other schemes. As we have seen in Section 3.4, CL signatures allow one to sign several messages, such that one can later on prove knowledge of a signature without revealing either the signature or the signed messages. If each attribute is encoded as a single message, revealing these attributes selectively can be done using the zero-knowledge protocol previously discussed, as shown here. Assume, for example, that messages m 1 and m 3 encode the attributes that one wants to reveal. Then, the prover and verifier engage in the following proof of knowledge.
If one wants to encode binary attributes (or attributes that take on only a few fixed values), this approach of selectively revealing attributes requires one to encode each attribute value (a single or only a few bits) as a full m -bit message. Thus, if a large number of such attributes is to be encoded, this approach is not very efficient: The computation and the number of group elements to be exchanged in the proof protocol would be linear in the number of attributes.
Proof Over Bit Commitments. As an alternative, one could encode all the binary attributes as a bit vector and then include that vector in a single message (or several ones, depending on the number of attributes). The resulting proof for disclosing attributes selectively seems to require committing to each individual attribute. One needs to prove that each commitment, indeed, only commits to a binary value, as well as that these committed values correspond to the certified message, and then needs to open the commitments to reveal the attributes in question. The communication and computational complexities of the resulting protocol would be even worse than those of the one just discussed.
Proof Over Bit Vector Concatenation. Let us consider the case in which only a single attribute should be revealed. We can obtain a more efficient proof protocol as follows. Without loss of generality, we assume that the vector has the structure (a b c), where b is the representation of the attribute that shall be revealed, and a and c are the representations of the remaining attributes that shall be proved. One would provide a commitment to a and c. Then one would prove (1) that both committed values have the right binary length and (2) that (a b c) is, indeed, signed by the issuer (without revealing a or c, of course). A proof that a commitment contains an -bit number can be done relatively efficiently with the tight interval proof proposed by Boudot 2000. Although this solution provides a proof protocol that does not depend on the number of attributes encoded, each interval proof requires about 12 commitments, plus some additional values. In addition, one needs to do l + 1 of them if l attributes are revealed. Even if one wanted to apply this for revealing a single attribute, this would no longer be considered efficient in practice.
We can optimize this proof method by exploiting the symmetry of the range proof interval and transformations of existing commitments, instead of computing fresh ones. Observe that the original interval is symmetric around zero with ±2 l as range. By squaring, we can reduce the Boudot interval proof to a single inequality proof. Thus, we need to compute the sum of four squares for the delta and show that
We obtain the four-squares representation from the Rabin and Shallit [1986] and compute additional commitments to its values.
where r i ∈ R ±{0, 1} n + ø , for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
Observe that we do not explicitly commit to the delta , as in a Boudot interval proof. We compute the representation of the delta on-the-fly, as part of the following proof (see the next-to-last line).
PK{ (ε, ν , μ 0 , μ, α, β, γ, 
The method presented allows the selective disclosure of a single bit-vector-encoded attribute with asymptotically constant number of exponentiations. The preceding optimized variant needs the computation of eight integer commitments in total-20 multibase exponentiations or 49 modular exponentiations. The cost of an AND proof is linear in the number of disclosed attributes.
EFFICIENT ATTRIBUTES FOR CL
In this section, we provide the means to efficiently encode a number of attributes into an anonymous credential. We focus on the computational cost when issuing and using a credential (note that the communication cost when using a credential is directly related to the computational cost-hence we only consider the latter). We show how to encode attribute values as (small) primes, such that a number of attributes can be encoded into a single message m j . We also show how one can reveal these attribute values selectively and how one can prove simple statements about them (OR, AND, and NOT connectives). Our basic idea is very simple: We set m j to be the product of the primes corresponding to the values of the different attributes. This encoding allows us employ divisibility to prove the presence and absence of attribute values. For instance, to prove that an attribute value encoded by prime e j is present, we prove that e j divides the message contained in the credential. We can also show that an attribute value is not present by showing that e j does not divide the message. We can realize OR statements by this method as well; that is, that the credential encodes, for instance, either e j or e l . This can be done by proving that there exists a value that divides both the product of e j and e l and the message contained in the credential. As we shall see, this idea yields very efficient proof statements and leads to, for example, an efficient implementation of an electronic identity card.
The CL Credential System and Attributes
We explain the CL credential system [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001, 2003 ] and how attributes can be encoded into its credentials. This will make it clear how the results presented in the remainder of this section can be used to build a full-fledged credential system with all the features added to the basic system over the years. These features include, for instance, revocation [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2002] , k-spendability [Camenisch et al. 2005] , and clone protection [Camenisch et al. 2006] .
In a traditional PKI (e.g., X.509), the issuer signs a user's public key, along with a text statement about the asserted attributes. Here, the public key needs to be disclosed and forms a static pseudonym; selective attribute disclosure is hampered. In the CL credential system, each user has a secret identity, that is, a single secret key s U . The issuer employs the CL signature scheme to sign the user's one secret key, as well as all the attributes the issuer wants to assert about the user. This signing is, of course, done in a "blind" way, notable by signing committed values, such that the issuer does not learn the user's secret key (cf., [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001, 2003] ). Thus, the user will have obtained a signature ( A , e, v) 
is the issuer's public key. Now, a user can show that she obtained a credential from some issuer and selectively reveal some of the attributes (or prove a statement about them) using the proof of knowledge of a signature that we recalled in Section 3.4. Confer to the example in Section 3.5.
As discussed, to achieve efficient encoding and proving of attributes for the CL credential system in our approach, we will encode products of primes into a user's credential, for example, we set a 1 as the product of the relevant primes e j . Thus, it remains to show how the user can selectively reveal attribute values encoded like this, that one out of a list of attribute values is encoded, or that an attribute value is not encoded into her credential.
Setup
The issuer performs the following setup. On input n , choose an n -bit RSA modulus n, such that n = pq, p = 2p + 1, and q = 2q + 1, where p, q, p , and q are primes. Choose, uniformly at random, R 0 , . . . , R L−1 , S, Z ∈ QR n . In addition, we require bases g and h for an integer commitment, for which the discrete logarithm log h g is unknown. As we can use the signer's SRSA setup for the integer commitment scheme as well, we let g and h be element of QR n . We establish a further group for our new OR proofs having prime order q. We choose two generators g and h of that group, such that log h g is unknown. The public key becomes (n,
Encoding
The number of bits we can encode into a message field of a CL signature is m , as described in the preceding section. Assume we want to encode t attributes into a single message field. Thus, we can only use primes of length up to m /t. If each attribute takes, at most, k different values, then we need to choose our m such that there exist tk primes smaller than 2 m /t (or, alternatively, choose t and encode the attributes into two or more messages). Let t < m /t be the length of the primes that we will be using (see also Section 6).
Assume we want to encode the attribute vector (a 1 , ...., a t ) with a i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and that we have enumerated all the primes 2 < e i < 2 m /t . Now we encode (a 1 , ...., a t ) by including the value E = t j=1 e (( j−1)k+a j ) in the credential. This means that the product E will be one of the messages that the issuer signs. (Here we assume that each attribute takes k different values, adapting the construction to cases in which some attributes take fewer values is straightforward.)
Proofs about Attributes
We now describe how we establish attribute proofs over prime encoding. We assume that the user (prover) has obtained a CL credential containing E, that is, a signature (A , e, v) on messages m 0 and m 1 with m 1 = E. (The attribute m 0 typically encodes the user's secret key [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2003] ).
AND Relation. Efficiently proving that a credential contains one or more attributes. Let us show how to efficiently implement a general AND statement over multiple attributes. To establish that E encodes a conjunction of values {e 1 , . . . , e k }, the prover shows that the product of these values divides E; that is, k j=1 e j | E. To convince the verifier that she was issued a credential such that this divisibility holds, the user needs to prove that she knows an integer m 1 , such that k j=1 e j m 1 = E and, therefore, engages in the following proof with the verifier.
THEOREM 4.1. If a prover is successful in the preceding protocol, she was issued a credential encoding all attributes corresponding to k j=1 e j .
PROOF (SEE EXTENDED PROOF IN CAMENISCH AND GROSS [2011])
. It is standard to show that there exists a knowledge extractor which can extract, from a convincing prover, the values ε, ν , μ 0 , μ 1 , such that Z ≡ tR
Moreover, as we have chosen n as the product of two safe primes, t must be ±1 (see, e.g., [Damgård and Fujisaki 2001] ). As CL signatures are unforgeable, we can conclude that there must exist some E, such that Z ≡ ±R
(mod n), from which we can conclude that E ≡ k j=1 e j μ 1 (mod p q ). This implies that E = k j=1 e j μ 1 must hold over the integers as we could factor n otherwise. Therefore, k j=1 e j is indeed a factor of E, as claimed.
NOT Relation. Showing that an attribute is not contained in E.
Proving that a given set {e 1 , . . . , e k } is not contained in the credential amounts to showing that e j E, for all e j ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e k }. This is equivalent to showing that their product is coprime with E: gcd E, k j=1 e j = 1. The user can do so by showing that there exist two integers a and b , such that aE + b k j=1 e j = 1. Note that a and b do not exist if the greatest common divisor is greater than 1. Also note that a and b can be computed efficiently with the extended Euclidian algorithm. The prover commits in an integer commitment to E:
She sends D to the verifier and runs the following protocol with D (where a and b are the secret, denoted by α and β, respectively). ). As before, it is standard to show that there exists a knowledge extractor that can extract, from a convincing prover, the values ε, ν , μ 0 , μ 1 ρ, α, β, ρ , such that the equations given in the proof specification hold. Let us see what one can derive from these equations. First consider the following equations.
From them, we can derive that g ≡ ±g
Unless the prover can compute log g h or a multiple of the order of g, it must hold that 1 = μ 1 α + k j=1 e j β. It is well known that α and β can only exist if k j=1 e j and μ 1 are co-prime, and thus e j μ 1 for all e j ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e k }. Because of the first equation of the proof of knowledge, we know that μ 1 is contained in the CL signature, and thus we can conclude that none of the e j is encoded in μ 1 , that is, in the credential the user proves knowledge of.
OR Relation. Showing that one of a list of attributes is contained in a credential.
Let us now show how we can implement a proof of a statement such as "I'm either a student, a retiree, or unemployed" as might be the case if one is eligible for a reduced entrance fee to a museum. More generally, we will realize a set membership proof over prime-encoded attributes. We assume that we are given encodings e 1 , ...., e of attribute values (possibly ranging over different attributes) for some . The idea we use here is that if a credential contains an attribute e that is contained in {e 1 , ...., e }, then there exists an integer a such that ae = i e i . If e is not in the set, then no such integer a exists, as e does not divide the product. Let us first assume that the issuer imposes that only one attribute gets encoded into a signed message. We will later see how we can extend this to several attributes.
To prove that her credential contains one of the attributes values e 1 , ...., e , a user can employ the following protocol. First, the user computes a commitment D to the attribute contained in her credential (in the same way as for the other protocols), sends it to the verifier, and then runs the following proof protocol with the verifier.
We leave the proof for this protocol to the reader and extend it, such that it also works in case more than one attribute is encoded into a signed message. So now, the goal is to show that one of the attribute values encoded in the credential is contained in the list {e 1 , ...., e }. The idea here is that the user commits to that attribute value and then shows that it divides the product of the attribute values on the list, as well as the message encoded in the credential. However, we must take some special care, as this statement also holds for ±1; therefore, we must make sure that the commitment does not contain ±1. To this end, we need an additional group, that is, one of prime order q and two generators g and h of that group, such that log h g is unknown. In addition to the commitment D to the attribute value in question, say e j , as before, the user computes the commitment D = g e j h r , where r is a random element from Z q . Finally, the following proof protocol will achieve our goal. α, β, δ, ρ, ρ , ρ , ϕ, γ, ψ, ξ, σ ) : 
PROOF (SEE EXTENDED PROOF IN CAMENISCH AND GROSS [2011]
). Again, one can extract, from a successful prover, the values (ε, ν , μ 0 , μ 1 , ρ, α, β, ρ, ρ , ρ , ϕ, γ, ψ, ξ, σ ) , such that all the equations given in the proof protocol specification hold.
Let us consider what we can derive from these equations. First, consider the equa-
Assuming the hardness of computing log g h, we have 1 ≡ γ (α − 1) (mod q), from which we can derive that α ≡ 1 (mod q). A similar argument can be made for g = (gD) σ h ξ regarding the statement α ≡ −1 (mod q), and hence α = ±1 will also hold over the integers. Now consider D ≡ ±g α h ρ (mod n) and
Assuming the hardness of factoring, we can conclude from these that α | i e i , and thus that α equals one of the e i or a product of them (as we know
, we can derive that βα = μ 1 holds over the integers, provided factoring is hard. As we thus have Z ≡ ±R
, it follows that α is encoded in the credential, and, therefore, that at least one of the attribute values encoded by e 1 , ...., e is contained in the credential issued to the prover.
Efficient Tight-Interval Proofs for Small Ranges
Based on joint work with Thomas Scott-Heydt Benjamin [2011], we proposed a method for efficient tight-interval proofs with prime encoding. In Section 3.5, we have already discussed the computational cost of tight-interval proofs with Boudot 2000, computing 12 commitments and a four-squares decomposition [Rabin and Shallit 1986 ] of the delta. Prime encoding offers a very efficient solution to tight-interval proofs, albeit only for small ranges (for instance, the ones encountered in proving that the year of birth is greater or smaller than a constant). We have two avenues to pursue: unary encoding of provable ranges and AND proofs, and enumeration of range elements by the verifier policy and OR proofs. We explain the core method and refer the reader to the report by for details.
4.5.1. Conjunction Interval Proofs. The idea of the conjunction construction is to encode all values that a user may possibly realize in a prime-product attribute exponent. For that, the issuer fixes a unary encoding of all realizable values to prime numbers. Let us assume that we want to prove that a user's year of birth is smaller than 1997. Then, the issuer assigns prime numbers to each realizable year, say, beginning with 1900, and issues the product of primes corresponding with her birth year and all future years (until overall expiration of the credential) to each user.
To prove that a user's attribute value is smaller than a policy value, the user needs to convince the verifier that she holds encodings for all values in that interval. If, in 2011, a prover wants to convince a verifier that her year of birth is smaller than 1997, she needs to show that she holds a conjunction of the primes k associated with the years [1997, 2011] . For such an interval e 1 , . . . , e k , the prover can efficiently prove this statement with a conjunction proof, as specified in Section 4.4.
The proof does not involve additional exponentiations compared with the credential proof of possession. With the cumulated prime size analysis in Section 6, we can show that we can encode intervals of 60-74 realized values into a standard message size of 256 bits. This is, for instance, sufficient for intervals over years of birth. Note that the unary encoding tailors the interval proofs for inequalities in one direction.
Disjunction Interval Proofs.
The user needs to prove that she holds a value that is part of an interval, where the interval is explicitly enumerated by the verifier's policy. We proceed with the preceding example of proving that the user's year of birth is smaller than 1997. In this avenue, the issuer designates prime numbers to years and issues the year of birth to the user.
The verifier enumerates all years fulfilling the requirement in an OR-proof policy over prime attributes. The prover, in turn, convinces the verifier that she holds one of the values enumerated. If a prover wants to convince a verifier that her year of birth is smaller than 1997, she needs to show that she holds one of the primes associated with the years [1900, 1996] , enumerated by the verifier. The prover can convince the verifier of this statement for a set {e 1 , . . . , e k } with a disjunction proof over the primes e i , as specified in Section 4.4.
This proof type has constant complexity in the number of exponentiations, with a lower constant overhead than a Boudot interval proof 2000. The burden for encoding attributes of an interval is carried by the verifier, enabling larger intervals. Still, the prime products need to be transmitted and included in the prover's proofs of representation, which imposes a soft restriction on the interval size.
Prime Encodings for Other Schemes
We have presented how one can encode attributes efficiently for the RSA-based CL credential system. Our method is intrinsically based on integer factorization and the ability to prove multiplicative relations among committed values over the integers. The only known efficient commitment scheme that works for the latter is proposed by Fujisaki and Okamoto [1997] and Damgård and Fujisaki [2001] , which relies on the Strong RSA assumption. Thus, our method works naturally with anonymity-providing schemes that themselves are based on the Strong RSA assumption (e.g., [Ateniese et al. 2000; Kiayias et al. 2004] ), and we made use of the fact that these schemes basically have the Damgård-Fujisaki-Okamoto scheme built into them.
Nevertheless, our method can also be applied to other anonymity-providing schemes (group signatures, e-cash systems, or voting schemes). This requires one to add the Strong RSA assumption to the list of assumptions the scheme is based upon, as we rely on the integer commitment scheme for proving the relations. Let us sketch how this would be done. First, the scheme needs to be capable of encoding attributes as exponents (most efficient schemes allow that, e.g., [Boneh et al. 2004; Brands 1995a; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2004] ). However, such an encoding is usually done in the exponent of a group where the prover knows the order, say q, and therefore all relations that can be proved about values contained in the credential hold modulo q only. To establish proofs over integers, the prover needs to provide an integer commitment to the attribute values contained in the credential (i.e., the product of the prime-encoded attribute).
Also, the prover needs to prove that the value contained in the commitment is also encoded in the credential. Here, one must apply care to prevent the prover from adding a multiple of q to the committed value; that is, the prover needs to prove that the commitment contains a value between 0 and q, which we can do using the range proof by Boudot [2000] at the cost of about five extra commitments and five proof terms.
EFFICIENCY
Our improved credential system encodes a large set of binary and finite-set attributes without significant performance impact. The computational complexity of a traditional CL proof of possession is linear in the total number of attributes, whereas our system's complexity only depends on the number of string/integer attributes. Binary and finite-set attributes are essentially free. Even though the number of binary/finite-set attributes has a influence on the performance, we can consider it as constant for all practical purposes.
3 Both schemes have identical complexity if credentials only contain string or integer attributes, and as soon as binary or finite-set attributes are involved, the prime encoding scheme achieves superior efficiency. Subsequently, we discuss our evaluation method for an efficiency analysis based on counting operations. We qualitatively and quantitatively compare traditional CL encoding and prime encoding independent from device configuration. Then we report on performance measurements with the Identity Mixer library [IBM 2010 ] on PC, in Section 5.4.
Evaluation Method
Our key goal is to improve the efficiency of the CL signature scheme on small devices, particularly on smartcards. We found the following three properties during the evaluation of smartcard capabilities (cf., [Bichsel et al. 2009] ).
(1) Most smartcards do not provide a primitive to execute multibase exponentiation (MExp.) on the cryptographic coprocessor. One either needs to resort to a software implementation of MExp. on the 8-bit ALU or to the modular exponentiation supported by the coprocessor. (2) Some cards do not provide sufficient low-level access to the square and multiply engine of the coprocessor, which hinders efficient software implementation of multibase exponentiations. (3) Some cards have severe restrictions of transient memory, which hamper a multibase exponentiation in one go. A software implementation can therefore experience a negative performance impact.
3 Our system uses prime exponents with a very short bit length and treats them in a single exponentiation. This single exponentiation becomes costly for a large prime product E = 1≤i≤ e j , as it requires O(log 2 E) multiplications. If one restricts the bit length of E to the standard message length parameter of Identity Mixer [IBM 2010 ] ( m = 256), one can handle 37 binary attribute realizations with the same complexity as one single exponentiation for a string/integer attribute (cf., Section 6).
We conclude that we cannot restrict our efficiency measurement to multibase exponentiations but also need to examine modular exponentiations.
Qualitative Analysis
Let us first consider the differences of traditional encoding in credential systems and prime encoding. We do so by comparing different proof statements for a credential with only two finite-set attributes. We focus on the computational workload of the prover, as small devices usually act in this role. In principle, all proofs with the CL credential system are structured as follows. The user provides a proof of possession of the credential first, potentially disclosing certain attribute values. The prover may commit to some attributes to facilitate further proofs (e.g., range). The proof of possession requires one term and exponentiations linear in the number of attribute bases, 4 such that
This sets the baseline of complexity for all subsequent proofs with the credential system. For readability, we subsequently replace the ranges of the attribute messages and exponents with "[. . .]". We exemplify the qualitative comparison of the traditional method and of prime encoding with respect to the OR proofs.
OR Proofs.
We use an example in which a user proves that either the attribute social benefit = social benefit or the attribute profession = student. We will elaborate on such a case in the context of electronic identity cards in Section 7.2. The traditional approach needs to produce an overhead proportional to the number of relevant attributes, as well as to the number of comparison alternatives. The system first commits to the relevant attribute values, which means computing the commitment, as well as proving knowledge of it.
PK{(ε, ν , μ 0 , μ 1 , μ 2 , ρ, ρ ) :
It then facilitates proofs of knowledge over the committed attribute values, in this case a disjunction of equality proofs. If the user intends to prove that her attribute is one out of ten variants, she needs to provide ten equality proofs similar to those.
PK{(ρ, ρ ) :
Our new method also facilitates the OR proof in a constant number of exponentiations. It involves (1) committing to the dedicated prime attribute R μ 1 1 in the second line of the proof statement; (2) showing that the user's attribute value is contained in the 
Number of bases
Notation: M.are multibase exponentiations; E.are modular exponentiations. L is the total number of attribute bases without secret key. l is the number of string/integer attributes, k is the number of primeencodable attributes/value set for multivariate finite-set attributes, and i is the number of attributes referenced in a proof.
list of options and that it divides the credential message (third line); and (3) proving that the commitment does not contain the values ±1 (two last lines), such that α, β, δ, ρ, ρ , ϕ, γ, ψ, ξ, σ ) :
This construction requires two commitments and four linear relationship proofs, in total. The number of terms and exponentiations is essentially independent of the number of OR Terms. We note that the prime exponents are publicly known and very small, thus g i e i counts as one exponentiation, for all practical purposes. Thus, we account for a constant overhead of 23 exponentiations over a normal proof of possession, in which five exponentiations are with small exponents.
Quantitative Analysis
We compare the computational complexity between the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya system, a bit-vector encoding, and our method in Table I . We count the number of multibase exponentiations and the number of modular exponentiations. The comparison is based on the following parameters.
-L is the total number of attribute bases without secret key.
-l is the number of string/integer attributes.
-k is the number of prime-encodable attributes/value set for multivariate finite-set attributes. -i is the number of attributes referenced in a proof.
We note that, in general, the proofs of possessions of CL credentials are impacted by the total number of attribute bases L, whereas the bit vector and prime encoding only depend on the number of string/integer attributes l. For simple attribute proofs, CL and bit-vector encoding require O(L) exponentiations, whereas our system only depends on the number of string/integer attributes O(l). If one considers a credential with only binary or finite-set attributes, CL and bit-vector encoding have a complexity of O(L), whereas our system runs in constant time O(1). The AND proofs in CL encoding are impacted by the total number of attributes and require O(L) exponentiations, whereas our system runs in constant time O(1). Once the proof of possession is complemented by an OR statement, CL encoding requires O(i) terms and O(L + i) exponentiations.
5 A traditional bit-vector encoding, as discussed in Section 4.1, involves bit commitments to all encoded attributes (two exponentiations for computing, two for proving), bitwise OR proofs for all attributes (two exponentiations), and one equality proof over their product (two exponentiations). This amounts to O(k + i) terms and O(L + i) exponentiations. Our system allows proofs with a constant term number. The total number of prime-encodable attributes k does not impact the performance at all. This comes at the cost of a constant overhead of 18 exponentiations.
To stress our point, we consider an experiment in which the number of primeencodable attributes is large against the number of string/integer attributes: k l. Say we only encode a huge number of binary or finite-set attributes (L = k i). In this case, the results are as follows. Proof statements with CL and bit-vector encoding will converge to O(L) exponentiations. Our system, however, converges to a constant number of terms and exponentiations O(1). Note that the bit length of the prime product exponent E impacts the complexity of this single exponentiation, as it requires O(log 2 E) multiplications. For all practical applications it is negligible.
Implementation Evaluation
We report on the implementation of prime encoding. Since Saner Celebi 2009 achieved the first implementation, prime encoding is now an established primitive in the Identity Mixer Library 2.3.2 [IBM 2010] and is publicly available for download from the Identity Mixer distribution site. 5.4.1. Usability. Prime encoding is integrated transparently into the Identity Mixer cryptographic library (cf., [IBM 2010, p.18, p.26ff and p.34ff ] ). Prime-encoded attributes are declared as attribute lists of type enum, as part of the credential structure specification during issuing. The credential structure also declares the association between the prime factor and the attribute value, as designated implementation. By that, administrators can include prime-encoded attributes in their policies without considering implementation details. Also, the functions and, not, and or over prime attributes are accessed on the policy level as statements over attribute lists of type enum. (modulus bit length n = 1024 bits, message exponent bit length m = 256 bits) with n ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25} random attribute values. The experiments execute the proofs of possession partially with undisclosed attributes, partially with selective disclosure of half of the attributes. Celebi considered two different realization choices for prime encoding.
(1) AND proofs computed directly on the prime product attribute E [CertC].
(2) AND proofs computed modularly on a separate commitment [CertP].
Celebi measured the average timing over the ten proofs per experiment and ten experiment runs.
Celebi reports that the prime encoding has almost constant execution time in both implementations, whereas the CL encoding exhibits a (super-)linear growth. For any attribute number n, the prime encoding is constantly at 1,000 ms for implementation (1) [CertC] and just below 4,000 ms in implementation (2) [CertP] . The CL encoding [CertR] grows from below 2,700 ms for five attributes to 6,600 ms for 25 attributes. For implementation (1), prime-encoding is strictly better; for implementation (2), there is a break-even point at 13 attributes, which is due to the overhead introduced by the additional intermediary commitment.
BIT-LENGTH CONSTRAINTS OF PRIME ENCODING
We analyze how many finite-set attributes we can compress into a single attribute base. We start with a theoretical consideration and exemplify these thoughts with a practical example. Let us consider (1) which attribute values are taken into account; (2) which bit length their product consumes; and (3) what impact that bit length has.
We first draw a distinction between an attribute and an attribute realization. An attribute is a named set of one or more values. Consider, for instance, the attribute profession with a value set of {none, doctor, civil servant, teacher, . . . }. The value set is the set for the entire user population. Note that any single user may only realize a small subset of these values. We call this subset attribute realization. Even though Fig. 2 . Bit length of the prime product for binary attributes, in which we encode both Boolean attribute realizations explicitly by a prime. We start with prime 5 and only count every second prime.
there may exist hundreds of attribute values, a user usually only realizes a number of them, and the issuer can enforce an upper bound on it. Therefore, we will discuss the number of permissible attribute realizations, not the number of attributes itself.
Second, we consider the bit length consumed by attribute realizations. The issuer determines the maximal bit length of a possible attribute realization E MAX in the system. This is the bit length of the corresponding prime product. We note that the issuer can safely choose very small primes for the encoding; in fact, it can start with prime 3. Let us analyze how the bit length of such prime products grows. We consider binary flags, that is, attributes with two associated prime values, where the user can only realize one of them. Figure 2 exhibits the growth of the bit length of the prime products for this explicit encoding of binary attributes. It constitutes the worst case of encoding possibilities. We observe that the bit length of prime products shows an approximately linear growth for the first few hundred numbers.
Third, the bit length of attribute realizations has a two-fold impact. First, as the prime product exponent E grows, the computation time for the corresponding exponentiation also grows significantly. Second, and more importantly, the possible bit length of an attribute exponent in CL is limited by the bit length of the SRSA exponent e. To accommodate for attribute realizations, this exponent also needs to be resized.
Let us consider the standard case according to the Identity Mixer specification: the bit length of e is specified as 596 bits, and the bit length of an attribute limited to 256 bits. This allows for 37 binary attributes to be stored without any change of system parameters. The user's credential can realize one value for each of the 37 attributes at the same time.
APPLICATIONS
Requirements
An application of our extension to the CL credential system needs to fulfill two requirements: (1) a sufficient supply of prime-encodings and (2) a certified binding between prime-encoding and discrete values. First, we observe that the number of primes below a certain number x is estimated by the prime number theorem as defined in, for instance, Shoup [2008] and converges to π (x) = x/ln(x). There exist, for instance, 75, 638 prime numbers whose size is smaller than 20 bits. This is a plentiful supply for most application scenarios. Second, the issuer needs to sign the binding between primes and discrete values as part of its public key. In this case, the binary/discrete values used by the credential system are static. As typical issuers are governments, banks, mobile operators, etc. who standardize their vocabulary for binary/finite-set attributes well in advance, this is not a problem for their applications. For highly dynamic applications with ad-hoc issuing of credentials with new attribute types, we can provide the attribute binding along with the credential and sign a hash as dedicated attribute. Therefore, our solution does not restrict any of the standard application scenarios of credential systems.
We have seen in Section 6 that space constraints impact the number of finite-set attributes the system can govern. The size of the attribute exponent in the user's credential limits the number of prime flags set in a credential. The size of the issuer's public key limits the total number of attribute realizations certified for the system. Thus, even if many sets in the real world are inherently finite, a system needs to balance between efficiency gain and space consumption.
The proposed credential system is particularly suited for multiple classes of attributes.
Binary. The attribute can either be present or not, true or false; for example, being a civil servant. Finite Data Structures. Complex data structures of discrete values from a finite set, in which trees are most useful: a user may realize a subtree or a path of a supertree predetermined by the issuer. Examples for such attributes are expertise or health taxonomies, as well as role hierarchies.
These attribute types impact a large variety of application scenarios. We choose electronic identity cards as our primary example and complement that with complex expertise, as well as medical credentials in Appendix B.
Examples for Electronic Identity Cards
Currently, different European countries are issuing different variants of electronic identity cards (EID). The computational restrictions of such smartcards are obvious. The desire for protection of citizen rights by privacy-enabling technologies is also a recurring topic. Particularly, in the area of secondary use-that is, when a third party accesses the user's data-privacy concerns surface quickly. In early proposals, arbitrary third parties could access the full dataset about the user.
We surveyed different datasets for EID and driver's license cards and use the Belgium EID card as example [SPF Intérieur 2005] . Table II outlines a superset of example attributes. The left column contains string and integer attributes, and the right column contains attributes encodable by our prime representation. We explicitly We tailored our scheme to attributes that have a finite set of values. The user may realize a multivalued subset. Minority status, profession, or academic degree are such attributes. A citizen may, for instance, be a doctor as well as a civil servant. Traditional CL signatures encode each attribute in a separate attribute base; multivariate attributes from finite-set CL even needs to encode each potential realization in a base. For the attributes in Table II , this results in 23 attribute bases. With our prime encoding, we can fold all binary and finite-set attributes into one attribute base. We choose a prime e i for all binary attributes and finite-set attribute realizations in Table II : this involves 193 possible realizations of nationality, 429 realizations of place of issuance districts, 6,400 districts for place of birth and several hundred professions, and 14 color variations for hair and eyes. We dedicate the first attribute base to the product of the corresponding prime numbers e j that the user realizes. We are left with five normal attribute bases and one attribute base R 1 for the prime encoding. Thus, the number of bases is already one fourth and all proofs of possession speed up by a factor of four.
Opinion Polls. An often discussed example is online opinion polls. In this scenario, a user proves that she belongs to a certain statistical class, while retaining a suitable anonymity set. Opinion polls usually gather demographic data but may also collect educational and professional parameters. We leave the general-range proof for the date of birth aside, as it is equally costly for both methods. However, prime encoding allows for efficient proofs over age classes (e.g., 20-25, 25-30, . . . ) and efficient tight-range proofs for the year of birth, as proposed in Section 4.5. The remaining 8 Application of such an attribute varies much from country to country. For instance, Belgium encodes a status for blind and for visually impaired citizens. The German driver's license also encodes the requirement to wear glasses. Further attributes for deaf or hearing-impaired citizens are thinkable. Although countries also envision attributes such as profession (e.g., doctor) or role as civil servant, their storage on the EID card itself is currently subject to much dispute. 9 Nationality and place of issuance will be encoded by an index number. We assume the minority and social benefit status as multivariate attributes with seven realizations spread over five attributes. For the potentially multivariate attributes profession and academic degree, we reserve five attributes in total. The number of attribute bases is, therefore, 23 and L = 24. proof may be constructed according to a conjunctive selective disclosure, as specified in policy P EID,OP :
A traditional approach requires a proof of possession over L attribute bases. 10 In Table III , we outline that our new system facilitates the proof without any overhead to the proof of possession. It is therefore only impacted by the l string/integer attributes. It is three times as efficient, even though we only save the k attribute bases for the prime-encodable attributes.
Cultural Subsidies. Virtually all countries grant subsidies for access to cultural institutions to particular population groups: children, students, senior citizens, as well as handicapped persons and persons eligible for social benefits. The corresponding groups sometimes hesitate to disclose their special status because of privacy concerns. Policy P EID,CS depicts a disjunction proof over attributes from Table II. minority (blind, vis impaired, deaf, . . .) social benefit (unemployed, social benefit) profession (student, teacher, civil servant) (type = kids card).
As demonstrated in Section 5.2.1, this amounts to a proof of possession, attribute commitment to all relevant attributes (nine terms), 11 and a second step disjunction of equality proofs for the possible attribute values (eleven terms). Our new scheme reduces the effort to a single multi-element OR proof in the prime encoding. As shown in Section 4.4, the user needs to provide a proof of possession with four terms, a commitment to the prime attribute base and proofs of their knowledge and division (three terms), as well as proofs that the commitment does not contain ±1 in a second group (three terms). We compare both methods in Table III and find that our new method is three times as efficient for all proofs of possessions, as well as the OR proof for policy P EID,CS .
Discussion
Our method is an enabler for credential systems on small devices. Until now, application designers for this area restricted themselves to simple scenarios: credentials must only govern a minimal number of attributes, and proof statements must be as simple as possible. The linear complexity in the total number of attributes for the proofs of possession puts credential-enabled EID systems at peril. A second challenge is the vastly growing number of terms and commitments-and, thus, computational and communication costs-for complex proof statements. These tremendous limitations rendered sensible applications on small devices virtually impossible.
We have shown that our prime-encoding idea makes complex proofs in various application scenarios possible. Be it a benefit access with a large anonymity set or collecting demographic data in a private manner (in the example of an electronic identity card), complex expertise taxonomies on a corporate card or structured diagnostic statements on a healthcare card, our system achieves tremendous performance boosts. This holds not only for the AND/OR example policies but also for the overall reduction of attribute bases. The latter parameter impacts every single proof. All these improvements bring applications barely running in feasible time with traditional encodings well within reach of small devices.
In addition to occupying a high ground in the quest for performance, the system comes with two subtle advantages: (1) discrete and structured attributes and (2) significant policy independence. First, we focus on discrete values from finite sets. These may be as simple as binary flags or as complex as data structures. In contrast to unstructured integer/string encoding, discrete values can be manipulated by equality and relationship proofs. Their semantics are accessible to the credential system itself. Second, our method requires a constant number of terms and commitments for pure equality, conjunction and disjunction proofs with binary/finite-set attributes. Independently of the number of AND/OR clauses in the policy, the proof only uses a fixed, low number of exponentiations. This makes a transaction and their expected response time predictable to device producers. 
CONCLUSION
We presented an extension to the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya credential system that features efficient encoding and proofs of binary and finite-set attributes. Using coprime and divisibility properties in proofs permits strong performance improvements. The price for this is to certify prime/attribute value relationships in the issuer's public key, which needs to be done similarly in the traditional encoding to establish the semantics of the attributes. We gain the ability to facilitate proofs of possession, equality, AND, NOT, and OR proofs very efficiently. Our method overcomes the fundamental limitation of all existing credential systems, namely, that their complexity is linear in the total number of attributes. It allows us to fold many finite-set attributes into a single attribute base, and therefore boosts the performance of all proofs of possession. Our new proof primitives on prime encoding facilitate AND, NOT, and OR statements with constant complexity and minimal overhead to a standard proof of possession. Our method requires no additional cryptographic assumptions apart from Strong RSA. 12 In traditional encodings this is not the case. If a traditional CL system receives a policy from a service provider that requires 25 finite-set attributes and 100 OR clauses, the system will facilitate 25 commitments and 100 equality proofs, executing roughly 150 exponentiations. Our system would finish after 23 exponentiations, independently of the policy. We stress that this holds for pure conjunctions (only containing AND clauses) and disjunctions (only containing OR clauses). This situation is more complex for nested logical statements.
Our method targets the major attribute classes of credential systems. In fact, we perceive that only a minority of attributes requires a generic string or integer attribute (such as name and birthday), whereas most attributes are either binary or taken from a finite set of discrete values. Those are the attributes that applications need for logical statements. Emerging efforts to standardize the vocabulary for identity federation protocols in different application areas support our hypothesis. We demonstrated that our method impacts real applications, such as electronic identity cards, as well as complex forms of professional and medical credentials. We briefly name the main parameters of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme and refer to IBM [2010] for a complete list.
-n . Bit length of the SRSA modulus n, for instance 2,048 bits. 
Attribute Space. Issuer chooses a number of attribute bases .
Generation of a Safe RSA Key Pair. Issuer generates the safe primes p and q , p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1, then computes n = pq . Consult the Identity Mixer Specification [IBM 2010] for suitable bit length for n ( n bits), p and q ( n /2 bits). (A , e, v) ), l ≤ l.
B. OTHER APPLICATIONS: PROFESSIONAL TAXONOMIES
Virtually all professional organizations have elaborate taxonomies of expertise and attributes of clients and objects. Most taxonomies are hierarchically organized and benefit from statements on all their granularity levels. The user may realize any subtree or path to a terminal leaf from the full taxonomy tree. 
Expertise
Let us assume that a professional organization or company decided to issue credentials to their members. These credentials could, for instance, contain an expertise classification according to the ACM Computing Classification Scheme. 14 This well-known taxonomy is a tree at depth four with eleven areas and roughly 1,400 disciplines, subdisciplines, and topics. To encode one path to a terminal leaf of the taxonomy (e.g., "E. Data -3. Data encryption -Public key cryptosystems -PKI"), a traditional credential system would require four attribute bases, that is, four bases per expertise area that the user can realize at the same time. We assume that an ACM member may choose three expertise areas. In addition, the ACM allows a choice from sixteen general terms, which are, in fact, a multivariate finite set. For this, a traditional credential system reserves additional bases. The total number of required bases is proportional to the depth of the taxonomy times the potential attribute realizations with an offset for the multivariate finite set. Prime encoding can arbitrarily represent many attribute realizations in just one attribute base.
Let us assume that a user wants to prove the following policy P CCS .
expertise ⊃ {E.Data, 3.Encryption, E.3.PKI} ∧ expertise ⊃ {D.SW, 4.OS, 4.6.Security, 4.6.Auth} ∧ general ⊃ {performance, security}.
This policy asks for a conjunction proof over all these attributes. Our system encodes the proof as a single multi-element AND proof integrated in the proof of possession. We compare the complexity in Table IV .
Medical Records
Healthcare practitioners classify all diseases according to the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) [World Health Organization WHO] . This is a taxonomy tree with depth five: chapters, subchapters, section, class, and subclass. 15 To encode a single path in such a taxonomy in a traditional credential system, one would require five attribute bases per terminal leaf realized. And clearly, there is a need for specifying multiple symptoms.
Even though healthcare cards are still in their infancy, there are debates on storing certified medical data on such cards. This option is very privacy-sensitive. Our proposal allows a selective disclosure of medical information according to standardized taxonomies with variable granularity. Implementing this on smartcards with traditional credential systems is virtually impossible as the growing number of attribute bases would render any proof of possession inefficient. Our system allows many realizations of deep taxonomies to be encoded within a single attribute base with strong performance improvements. For instance, let us assume that a user holds a certified diagnosis credential that may reserve five possible paths in the taxonomy. The policy P MED demands proof that one of the diagnoses matches either one of a set of, say 25, bacterial disease classes that are eligible for acquiring broad-spectrum antibiotics. Clearly, it is highly desirable to hide the actual diagnosis in certain applications. Therefore, the proof must be done with an OR proof without disclosing the actual disease. This policy is similar to earlier OR proofs, such as those exercised in Section 5.2.1, but restricted to a single relevant attribute. Our credential system does the same proof using only a third of the term numbers and a fourth of the required exponentiations of the CL credential systems as shown in Table V .
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